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THE NEED TO RESURRECT SECTION 5 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
KEESHA M. MIDDLEMASS, PH.D.*I
INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA),2 has protected
minority voting rights across the country since its passage, and its
significant power lies in the combination of Section 4(b)3 and Section 5.4
Together, these two Sections function to stop purposeful discriminatory
voting practices, procedures and policies from being implemented. 5 Until
recently, Sections 4(b) and 5 had the backing of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the force of the U.S. Supreme Court behind them. However,
with the 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder,6 the Supreme Court
undermined a key provision of the Voting Rights Act, Section 4(b). The
Court held that "Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its
formula can no longer be used as basis for subjecting jurisdictions to
preclearance." 7 The preclearance provision in Section 5 only retains its
power in Section 4(b) of the VRA; Section 4(b) determines the states and
political subdivisions "covered" by the VRA and subject to Section 5
preclearance. With the Court's invalidation of Section 4(b) in Shelby
County, the foundation of Section 5 no longer remains.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas; B.A., Wichita State
University; M.A. and Ph.D., University of Georgia; kmiddlem@trinity.edu.
I Large parts of this manuscript are from the author's dissertation. KEESHA MIDDLEMASS, The U.S.
Justice Department & the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Preclearance and the Implementation of Section
Five (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with author).
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973a-p, 2006).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (containing the "coverage formula" that defines the jurisdictions mandated to
have their electoral changes precleared under Section Five by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.).
4 42. U.S.C. §1973c(a) (explaining that "covered" jurisdictions, as designated by Section 4(b), must
have any changes in their voting laws precleared by either the U.S. Attomey General or the U.S.
District Court of the District of Columbia).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (outlining the procedure for the types of electoral changes that must be
precleared).
6 Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
7 Id.at2615.
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Through a historical analysis, I argue that Section 4(b) must be
resuscitated in order to resurrect Section 5; without these two Sections of
the VRA, the federal government has few legal resources to prevent the
passage and implementation of racially and ethnically discriminatory
voting procedures and election laws. Pre-Shelby County, previously
covered states, such as Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia, as well as covered
political subdivisions, such as counties, in California, Florida, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota were
captured by Sections 4 and 5.8 Post-Shelby County, these states and
subdivisions can now amend, change, and alter their voting and election
laws, including redrawing legislative districts, without prior approval from
DOJ or the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia (D.C.D.C.).
There is no preemptive federal law that forbids the implementation of
voting changes that have a discriminatory purpose or intent, and there are
no laws to protect the ability of racial, ethnic or language minorities in
electing their preferred candidate. 9 Shelby County is significant because it
opened the legislative flood gates to a new era of "voting rights" that
resemble pre-1965: Conservative state legislators have been passing and
implementing new election laws with the intent to restrict access to the
ballot and undermine the voting rights of the very groups the VRA was
designed to protect.
In this Article, Part I analyzes the history and purpose of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, focusing specifically on the preclearance provision in
Section 5 and the coverage formula in Section 4(b). Part II describes the
role of DOJ and its enforcement of Section 5 in states subject to
preclearance.
Part III examines Shelby County, and discusses the
magnitude of the decision, and its determination of why Section 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Part IV considers the changing
political environment since Shelby County, and how previously covered
states are now actively passing new voting and election laws with the
knowledge that they no longer have to submit their electoral changes for
Section 5 review.
Taking into consideration recent legislative
developments in formerly covered states, I argue that when Congress
reauthorized the Voting Rights Act preclearance provision in 2006 for

1

8 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (establishing that these states were captured under Section 4(b), and had to
preclear their electoral laws under the 1965 Voting Rights Act); 1970 Amendments, Pub. L. 91-285,
June 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 314; 1975 Amendments, including the Language Amendments, Pub. L. 94-73,
August 6, 1975, 89 Stat. 402.
9 42 U.S.C. §§1973c(b)-(d).

2015] THE NEED TORESURRECTSECT7ON5 OF THE VOTNG RIGHTSACT

63

another 25 years, to 2031, Sections 4 and 5 were still necessary to combat
racially discriminatory laws.
Despite the election and re-election of President Obama, race continues
to be a profound issue when it comes to minority voting rights and electoral
representation; therefore, Section 5 needs to be resurrected because of its
role in protecting racial and language minority voting rights. Section 4(b)
must be saved so that covered states return to having their voting rights and
election laws reviewed and precleared under Section 5. This is necessary
for at least two reasons: One, some of the newly minted laws are suspect
regarding their racial intent and effect-but some are clearly geared
towards undermining racial minority voting strength. In some previously
covered jurisdictions, state legislators have dusted off earlier electoral
changes that were denied preclearance by DOJ before Shelby County and
began implementing them within days of the decision. Two, as the
country's demographic characteristics are quickly shifting, and racial and
language minorities, traditionally core voting blocs of the Democratic
Party, are increasingly living in or moving to formerly covered states and
political subdivisions, these voters are now without the protection of
Section 5 in future elections.10
PART I. HISTORY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

The significance of the 1965 Voting Rights Act cannot be understated. It
single-handedly targeted the white power structure, which held onto its
political, social and economic power through its massive efforts to
disenfranchise Black voters. 11 The Fifteenth Amendment1 2 was designed
to secure the right to vote for Blacks, but securing the right to vote 95 years
after its passage was still painfully slow; the VRA was designed to change
that history.
The VRA "imposed measures drastic in scope and extraordinary in
effect,"' 3 eliminating literacy tests and other tests and devices that southern
states used to prevent Black citizens from registering to vote and casting a
ballot in local, state and federal elections. 14 Section 5 was specifically
10 ROBERT MCDUFF, The Voting Rights Act and Mississippi: 1965-2006, 17 S. CAL. REv. L. &
SOC. JUST. 475,499 (2008).
11 ELLEN KATZ ET AL., Documenting Discriminationin Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 691 (2006).
12 U.S. CONST., amend. XV (the right to vote cannot be denied on the basis of race).
13 KATZ, supranote 11, at 644.
14

WAYNE ARDEN ET AL., RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE

1990s, at 85 (Bernard Grofman, ed.,

1998); HEATHER K. WAY, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument
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designed as a safeguard to deter and challenge further state
disenfranchisement efforts in states with a history of discrimination and as
a preventive measure to target and prohibit political jurisdictions from
creating, implementing and enforcing new racially prejudiced and
discriminatory voting practices, procedures and rules designed to thwart
implementing the Fifteenth Amendment.15 States political jurisdictions
"covered" by the VRA had to first gain approval from DOJ or the
D.C.D.C.,16 which was deliberate. The VRA was designed to "banish the
blight of racial discrimination in voting"1 7 by responding to the
"unremitting and ingenious defiance" of the Fifteenth Amendment in
certain parts of the country.' 8 In an effort to protect voting rights once
gained, Congress also incorporated measures into the VRA with the intent
to prevent "backsliding" and the implementation of new discriminatory
electoral practices and procedures. 19 The problem that Congress attempted
to address was the problem of the 2 0 th Century-the problem of the colorline.2 0 To reach this end, Congress called for an uncompromising response
to the elaborate schemes and election measures passed by legislatures,
particularly in the South, but outside of the South as well.
Although the color-line, an indisputable line that utilized extra-legal
sanctions to preserve white supremacy and keep the races separate, is no
longer maintained through de jure laws, it is still visible; political power
remains in the hands of a limited few, with the occasional Black or Latino
candidate breaking through to win state-wide or national office. Such
tokenism does not lead to inclusive policies or politics for the larger
minority community. Racial inequality and rampant segregation in cities
and towns, school districts, religious congregations, and social settings
does not lead to racial progress, collective rights, or integration; rather,
minority voting rights have had to been protected through extensive
measures, including the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 21 Of these efforts, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the
for the Incorporation of Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1439; See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000) as amended
Pub. L. 94-73, tit. I, § 101, tit. II, §§ 201-203, 206.
15 U.S. CONST., amend. XV (the right to vote cannot be denied on the basis of race).

16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
17 South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
18 Id., at 302; U.S. CONST., amend XV (the right to vote cannot be denied on the basis of race).

19 KRISTEN CLARKE, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How
Much DiscriminationCan the Constitution Tolerate? 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385-433 (2008).
20 W.E.B. Du BOIS, The Souls of Black Folk, Cambridge, MA: University Press John Wilson and

Son (1903).
21 Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990 (CHANDLER
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22
most significant voting rights law passed in the 2 0 1h Century.
The VRA was extraordinary because it granted discretionary authority
DOJ to preclear (accept) or deny any proposed changes in election
instruments, voting rights, registration rules, polling places, district lines,
and other election related procedures for local, state, and federal elections
Section 5 required covered
in jurisdictions covered by the Act.
jurisdictions to obtain federal approval prior to implementing a change to
procedures or rules of voting and election practices. This was a major
point of contention as the federal government intruded into a policy domain
previously controlled by state and local officials, but the federal intrusion
was necessary due to the unwillingness of white elected officials to
desegregate the voting booth.23

Section 4 and Section 5: How They Work Together
Section 5 does not stand alone; rather, it works in tandem with Section
4.24 Section 4 contains the coverage formula to identify jurisdictions that
were to be "covered" by Section 5 and the bailout provision. 25 Section 4(a)
reads, in part, as follows:
To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not
denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied
the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his
failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to which
the determinations have been made under subsection 4(b) or in any political
subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a
separate unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or
subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or
device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
26
on account of race or color.
Section 4(b), known as the "trigger mechanism," sets the coverage
formula to determine which states and/or political sub-jurisdictions must
DAVIDSON & BERNARD GROFMAN, eds., 1994); ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM,

The

Supreme Court, Race and Civil Rights: From Marshall to Rehnquist (1995).
22 FRANK P. PARKER, Black Votes Count: PoliticalEmpowerment in Mississippi after 1965, at 1

(1990); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The
ContinuedNeedfor Preclearance.51 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1983).
23 See CLARKE, supranote 19; PARKER, supra note 22; MCDONALD, supranote 22.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1973b-c; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

25 42U.S.C. §1973b.
26 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a).
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abide by Section 5. Section 4(b) reads as follows:
The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or in any
political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines
maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to
which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50
percentum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on
November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 percentum of such persons voted in
the presidential election of November 1964.
If a state as a whole or a sub-jurisdiction within a state is captured by
Section 4(b), the same criteria and standards are applied when submitting
electoral changes for Section 5 review to DOJ or the D.C.D.C.27 The VRA
directed DOJ or the D.C.D.C. to look for any discriminatory purpose
behind all new electoral changes and if the new changes would have a
discriminatory effect once implemented. "A covered jurisdiction cannot
implement the electoral change until the declaratory judgment action
[D.C.D.C.] or administrative [DOJ] preclearance is obtained." 2 8
Constitutionalityof the Voting Rights Act
Immediately after its passage, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and in
particular Section 5, was constitutionally tested and subjected to legal
challenges. 2 9 The Section 5 provision of the VRA, mandating covered
jurisdictions submit all electoral changes to the federal government prior to
their implementation, was met with massive resistance from southern
jurisdictions. 30 In view of the Act's controversial requirements, southern
jurisdictions challenged Congress' exercise of power to pass a law to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and prohibit states' rights to restrict and
control access to the ballot. 3 1 Southern states immediately challenged the
constitutionality of the VRA, and the first challenge came in South
27 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
28 Id., supra note 1, at 96. See MARK POSNER, "Post-1990 Redistricting and the Preclearance
Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act" in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, at 83
(BERNARD GROFMAN, ed., 1998). Covered jurisdictions could obtain a declaratory judgment for
preclearance from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or submit a preclearance request
to DOJ.
29 See AARON M. MOORE, Preserving the Ark of Our Safety: How a Stronger Administrative
Approach Could Save Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 531-63 (2012).
30 CLARKE, supra note 19, at 386. See also, MOORE, supra note 29, at 5. Jurisdictions captured by
Section 4 must comply with Section 5 and obtain preclearance approval through the administrative
process by submitting any changes to the Justice Department or judicially by means of a declaratory
judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Without preclearance, the voting or
electoral change is deemed legally unenforceable.
31 South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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32
Carolinav. Katzenbach.
South Carolina argued that the VRA, and in particular Sections 4 and 5,
violated the U.S. Constitution and mandated unnecessary intrusion by the
federal government into the states' affairs. In an eight-to-one decision, the
Supreme Court disagreed, and declared that the Voting Rights Act of 1965
was constitutional in all of the sections challenged, including most of
Section 4 and all of Section 5.33 In denying South Carolina's challenge and
affirming the constitutionality of the VRA, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that the long history of discrimination in South Carolina (and the South in
general) was evidence enough of the discriminatory practices carried out by
the state, and nothing short of the federal government's continual
administrative and political pressure would get elected state officials to act
in a manner that was antithesis to their own political goals. 34 Katzenbach
held that DOJ had the authority, by way of its principal, Congress, to
intervene directly in local and state issues to ensure that the Fifteenth
Amendment was enforced.
This was made possible through the
preclearance process, ensuring that racial discrimination in the electoral
35
process would be deterred, and when found, challenged.
The Katzenbach decision was a major victory for civil rights activists.
Moreover, the decision gave a broad reading of the legislative history, and
congressional intentions and purpose behind the wording and institutional
organization required to implement the VRA. The Court reasoned that "the
Voting Rights Act reflects Congress's firm intention to rid the country of
racial discrimination in voting" 36 and "was designed by Congress to banish
the blight of racial discrimination in voting." 37 Once the Supreme Court
declared the Act constitutional in Katzenbach, the legal challenges came in
different forms.
Like South Carolina, the story of Mississippi's voting rights history is
the story of racial strife, and resistance and defiance of federal intrusion on
behalf of Black voters aspiring to attain their equal right to vote. In the
wake of the passage of the VRA and its implications for Mississippi

32 Id.

33 Id., at 302.
34 HOWARD BALL, DALE KRANE & THOMAS P. LAUTH, Compromised Compliance:
Implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act 195 (1982).
35 The legal history surrounding Section 5 makes abundantly clear that the covered jurisdiction
bears the burden of proof. The placement of the burden of proof on covered jurisdictions is a
significant focus of opposition to the Voting Rights Act. See also, Georgia v. UnitedStates, 411 U.S.
526 (1973), where the Supreme Court rejected a challenge in how DOJ interpreted and implemented the
VRA.
36 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
37 Id., at 308.
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politics, a political battle ensued over how best to maintain the status quo in
Mississippi (e.g. white supremacy) in light of the VRA's constitutionality.
In January 1966, the Mississippi State Legislature convened a session to
craft and direct a "massive resistance" agenda. 38 The goal of the 1966
Mississippi legislative session was to nullify the VRA's influence in
Mississippi and to ensure newly gained Black voting and political power
was cancelled or greatly diminished. Approximately thirty bills addressing
election laws, voting rights, and the political process were introduced in
early January, signifying that the bills were drafted prior to the start of the
39
legislative session.
The Mississippi legislature attempted to maintain silence about the racial
motivation behind proposed legislation, so public hearings about the
discriminatory effect of the new measures were avoided; although there
were a few references to race and nullifying the Black vote, there was little
floor debate that mentioned race as a motivating factor. 4 0 By the time the
legislative session was over, the all-White Mississippi legislature and
Governor enacted thirteen of the 30 proposed bills; although none of the
bills denied the right to vote outright, they radically altered Mississippi's
election laws by making it more difficult for Blacks to vote, access the
polls, and elect candidates of their choice. 4 1 Despite the state's attempt to
be silent about its racial motivation, it was common knowledge that the
thirteen new laws were purposely designed to nullify the Black vote; the
actions carried out by the state were so blatantly discriminatory, it attracted
the attention of the federal government.
In light of Katzenbach 42 Mississippi's attempt to use its political powers
to pass and implement racially discriminatory laws and policies was an
attempt to challenge the VRA in a more oblique manner; instead of
challenging the Act itself, state's like Mississippi changed their strategy
and attacked different features of the Act like the types of electoral
practices and procedures that were germane to the VRA and subject to
Section 5 preclearance. Mississippi's actions were so deliberate, however,
that it was just a matter of time before its resistance plan had to be
addressed by the federal courts. Following Mississippi's 1966 legislative
session, the U.S. Supreme Court heard three critical cases that
demonstrated the need for covered jurisdictions to submit their electoral
38 PARKER, supra note 22.

39 Id., at 36.
40 Id., at 48.
41 Id.
42 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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changes for Section 5 preclearance; two of the cases came out of

44
43
Mississippi: Allen v. State Board of Elections and Perkins v. Matthews,

and the third case was Georgia v. United States.45 In each of these three
cases, the Court did not waver in its commitment to protecting the voting
rights of Black citizens, and set in place standards about the types of
electoral processes subject to Section 5.46 As a result of Mississippi's
patent attempt to undermine Black voting rights, the court cases generated
key wins for the protection of voting rights, further reinforced the
constitutionality of the VRA, and buttressed DOJ's role in reviewing
47
electoral and voting changes in covered jurisdictions.
The White House, DOJ, and the federal courts played critical but
different roles in how the national government responded to Mississippi's
obvious efforts to derail minority political participation. The Nixon
Administration was resistant to the VRA, and attempted to slow down the
execution and implementation of the VRA by DOJ,48 which is one example
of the potential power the White House could have in shaping the direction
of voting rights policy. 49 The Nixon Administration wanted to pre-define
the parameters of how DOJ put into practice the VRA when it reviewed
Yet, there was not much that the Nixon
state election laws.50
Administration could do: In the face of direct opposition from the White
House, the federal courts aggressively involved themselves in voting rights
issues, preventing the White House from exerting any long-term pressure,51
plus the involvement of the courts also ensured that the White House could
52
not define how the VRA was going to be implemented.
Allen v. State Board of Elections53 brought the state's massive resistance

plan supported only by white Mississippians out into the open. In the case,

43
44
45
46
47

Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
Perkinsv. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
See Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491, 502 (1992).
Id.; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1 at 45; PARKER, supranote 22, at 35-7.

48 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

49 Id. at 46-7; PARKER, supranote 22, at 184.
50 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 46-7; PARKER, supra note 22, at 184.
51 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 46.
52 Id., supra note 1.
53 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 546 (1969) (discussing changes involving the
manner of voting, where the Court was asked to address the following issues: can a private litigant
bring suit to determine whether a voting change falls under Section Five; should private litigants bring
suit in local courts or the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia? Did Congress intend for such
suits to be heard before three-judge district courts with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court? What
is meant by a "voting qualification or prerequisite for voting, or standard, practice or procedure with
respect to voting" under Section Five?)

JOURNAL OFCIVIL RIGHTS &ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:1

70

the Court did not decide whether or not Mississippi's statutes should be
struck down as racially discriminatory, but rather had to decide whether or
not the VRA required Mississippi to have its new laws precleared prior to
their implementation to determine their possible discriminatory purpose or
effect. The sole issue was one of interpretation: If the Court took a broad
position, then all covered jurisdictions would be obligated to submit
electoral and voting legislation to DOJ for preclearance, but if the Court
read Section 5 narrowly, then only some changes would be subject to
Section 5.54
Black political participation hinged on the Supreme Court taking the
former position, and broadly interpreting the VRA and Section 5 to apply
to all electoral changes in covered jurisdictions,5 5 but Mississippi officials
argued for the latter; a narrow reading of the VRA would benefit the state's
massive resistance plan. Mississippi lawyers first argued that the state's
new statutes were not covered by Section 5, and then suggested to the
Court that a broad reading of Section 5 would conflict with previous
federal court decisions and create tension with DOJ's implementation of
the VRA.
Lawyers representing Black Mississippi voters wanted the Court to
broadly read into the VRA the type of electoral changes that had to be
precleared. To counter the arguments put forth by Mississippi officials, the
plaintiffs argued that the 1965 congressional hearings devoted to the
passage of the VRA signaled that Congress intended for a broad
interpretation of the Act and its Sections due to past discriminatory history
and states' willful evasion of court decrees in other civil rights cases. The
congressional record reveals what Congress intended when passing
legislation, and in utilizing the congressional record in Allen, the plaintiff's
also made clear to Congress' agent, DOJ, as well as other institutional
actors, namely DOJ's other principals, the White House and the federal
courts, the intent of the law. 56 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs, holding that the state of Mississippi could not implement
any electoral changes unless they were precleared under Section 5,57 and
directed DOJ to review the new laws implemented by Mississippi's State
58
Board of Elections.
Allen was the first case that the Court used the language in Katzenbach
54
55
56
57

MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 47.

58

MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

Id., at 47.
Id. at 48; CLARKE, supra note 19, at 388.
MCDUFF, supra note 10, at 475.
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to address a number of key holdings brought by private plaintiffs from
Mississippi and Virginia. In each individual challenge, local citizens
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of uncleared voting changes. The state
statutes in dispute revolved around several issues related to write-in ballots,
changing an elected board to an appointed board, altering a district-based
election system to an at-large voting scheme, and replacing the rules for
candidates running in a general election. Drawing on the "one person, one
vote" principle, the Court recognized in Allen that "[t]he right to vote can
be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute
prohibition on casting a ballot." 59 Again, the Court interpreted Section 5's
preclearance requirement broadly, and applied it to all electoral changes,
including statutes affecting registration, voting, and candidate access to
being placed on the ballot. 60 In Allen, the Supreme Court held: "Private
litigants may invoke the jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain relief
under § 5, to ensure the Act's guarantee that no person shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply with an unapproved new enactment
subject to that section." 6 1 The Court also held that suits brought by private
litigants seeking a declaratory judgment regarding a new state statute are
subject to Section 5's requirements, and these actions may be brought in
the local district courts. 62
The Court changed the nature of the federal-state relationship in Allen,
and its effect was extraordinary; the Court determined that each of the
challenged state statutes were subject to the approval requirements of
Section 563 because the Act recognizes that voting includes "all action
necessary to make a vote effective," and that "any action [and disputes]
under this section [5] shall be heard and determined by a court of three
judges." 64 The Court's approval of the unique institutional arrangement of
Section 5 was aimed at the subtle, as well as obvious, state regulations that
could effectively deny citizens their right to vote because of race. 65
With the constitutionality of the Act decided in Katzenbach, Allen
marked a clear victory in the continuation of an aggressive federal
approach to protecting minority voting rights by answering several related
questions, including:

59 Allen, 393 U.S. at 569.
60 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 100.
61 Allen, 393 U.S. at 555.
62 Id. at 559.

63 Id. at 565.
64 Id. at 561.
65 Id. at 546, 565-66.

72

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol.28:1

[W]hat kinds of voting-law changes are covered under Section Five?
Were the preclearance procedures limited strictly to proposed changes in
voter registration laws or balloting procedures? Or should the preclearance
requirement be applied more broadly to cover all changes that might affect
66
the impact of the vote?
When the Warren Court argued that the VRA should be given the
broadest possible reach, Allen set in motion the legal framework for
Section 5, and sent a clear sign that the federal courts, which were giving
instructions to DOJ on what was permissible under Section 5, would
provide critical support to uphold the VRA and Section 5.67
The Allen decision created more work for DOJ: For instance, once the
Court determined that all of the challenged Mississippi statutes were
subject to Section 5 review, the Assistant Attorney General, Jerris Leonard,
acting on behalf of the Attorney General, John Mitchell, lodged a Section 5
objection to all of the statutes challenged in Allen. 68 Mississippi submitted
its 1966 statutes to DOJ for review in May 1969, and as soon as DOJ began
to object to other southern electoral schemes following Allen, other
comparable electoral laws and amendments proposed by covered
jurisdictions were sent to DOJ for Section 5 review, increasing the work
load of the Voting Rights Section. However, the increased work load and
the number of Section 5 submissions indicated that DOJ was creating a
deterrent effect; 69 instead of covered jurisdictions passing new legislation
and then attempting to implement overtly discriminatory electoral changes,
they began to submit changes in their voting procedures and practices, and
in time the number of submissions passing muster with Section 5 review
improved; covered jurisdictions had decided that by submitting their plans
for preclearance and being in compliance with the VRA was less expensive
than adopting discriminatory voting procedures and practices, and then
70
fighting for their implementation in federal court.
Yet, Mississippi was obstinate; two years after Allen, in Perkins v.
Matthews,7 1 a case from Canton, Mississippi, made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The case involved an at-large electoral system in the City
of Canton. In 1962, the state passed a law requiring city aldermen to be
66 PARKER, supranote 22, at 92.

67 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 48.
68 Id., at 49.
69 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
70 Id; BALL ET AL., supranote 34; See PARKER, supranote 22, at 8.

71 Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-95 (1971) (holding that changing locations of polling
places, changing boundary lines through annexations, and changing from ward to at-large election of
aldermen were changes in election procedure requiring federal approval).
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elected at-large. "In violation of this state law, the City of Canton
continued to elect individuals from single-member wards[, and i]n 1969, in
an attempt to comply with the state law, the city implemented an at-large
election system." 72 Local voters and candidates argued that the plan had to
be precleared, while the City claimed it had no other choice than to comply
with the 1962 state law. The lower court agreed with the City and did not
provide relief; that decision was challenged, and was overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the 1969 changes were a new
procedure with respect to voting and one that was different from the
procedure in place before its implementation, and therefore required
preclearance. 73 The Court ruled that each of the changes to the electoral
systems in Canton fell under the considerations of Section 5 as a "standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1, 1964," and required prior submission. 74 Perkins
ruled that the change from single-member districts to an at-large election
system for aldermen had to be pre-cleared because the changes in boundary
lines, mainly through annexations, determined who was eligible to vote;
annexations tend to dilute the weight of votes for those who had the
franchise prior to annexation. 75
In a third challenge to the VRA, Georgia v. United States, 76 the Court
held that Georgia's 1972 reapportionment changes had the potential to
dilute the Black vote, and within the meaning of Section 5, as interpreted
by Allen,77 had to be pre-cleared. 78 Georgia's original redistricting plan
was rejected by the U.S. Attorney General, and therefore it was incumbent
on the state to submit additional information in response to the rejection,
including the racially discriminatory purpose or effect on minority voting
rights; however, the state of Georgia failed to meet this burden. 79
Therefore, DOJ objected, and the state was required to have its redistricting
plan reviewed by the D.C.D.C. for preclearance. Georgia objected, so the
Supreme Court weighed in, holding that the DOJ and U.S. Attorney
General's regulations and review process were "wholly reasonable, and
consistent with the Act." 80 In essence, Georgia reinforced the notion that
72 MIDDLEMASS, supra

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

note 1,at 103.

Id.
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-90 (1971); Id.
Perkins,400 U.S. 379 (1971).
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534 (1973).
Allen, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
Georgia, 411 U.S. at 531-35.
Id. at 536-39.
Id. at 541.
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all electoral changes in covered states required preclearance, that any
changes that dealt with voting, access and representation could not be
implemented without prior approval from DOJ or the D.C.D.C., and if
covered states objected and refused, DOJ could object.
Allen and Perkins, both cases from Mississippi, and Georgia, were
important for six main reasons. First, Mississippi's actions toward Black
citizens helped secure the necessary votes in Congress to reauthorize
Section 5 of the Act in 1970.81 Second, the earliest court cases and legal
decisions establishing the principle of minority vote dilution in Supreme
Court jurisprudence came out of the state of Mississippi. 82

Third,

Mississippi and other southern states massive resistance to changing the
status quo helped strengthen Section 5's preclearance requirement; DOJ's
role as the main enforcer of Section 5 was protected, and it alone was able
to craft a set of practices and principles to determine if an electoral change
or voting procedure was racially discriminatory. 83 DOJ and the federal
courts served as the main federal institutions that protected the right of
Black citizens to vote, and ensured that any "backsliding" would be
ferreted out so that the right to vote would not be abridged on account of
race. 84 Fourth, the Court made clear that Section 5 was constitutional,
which meant that all laws in covered jurisdictions pertaining to voting had
to be submitted to DOJ or the D.C.D.C. for preclearance. Fifth, the Court
relied on the congressional record and legislative debates surrounding the
passage of the VRA in 1965 to reinforce the purpose of the VRA in
ensuing decisions. 85 Sixth, the U.S. Supreme Court established four
typologies governing voting, the mechanisms or procedures of voting, and
electorally substantive procedures subject to preclearance: (1) changes in
the manner of voting; (2) changes in candidacy requirements and
qualifications; (3) changes in the composition of the electorate that may
vote for candidates for a given office; and (4) changes affecting the
creation or abolition of an elective office. 8 6 In less than a decade after the
passage of the VRA: it was deemed constitutional; Section 5 was affirmed
and reaffirmed; the federal courts unfailingly read the VRA broadly to
81 MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.
82 C.E. TEASLEY, III, Minority Vote Dilution: The Impact of Election System and Past
Discriminationon Minority Representation. STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T REV. 95-100 (1987).
83 MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.
84 Id., at 103; BALL ET AL., supranote 34.

85 See SCOTT GLUCK, CongressionalReaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337 (1996); CLARKE, supra note 19. The fact that
the Court relied on the congressional record becomes important in Shelby County (2013).
86 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
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interpret the types of electoral procedures and practices, subtle and
obvious, minor and major that were subject to Section 5 review; and
categories of election laws that dealt with substantive issues like
87
representation was just as important as the voting procedures.
The single aim of the Voting Rights Act was Black enfranchisement in
the South, and with the help of the federal courts, minority voting rights
were protected and expanded exponentially under Section 5, undermining
the massive campaign in the South to resist changing its politics around the
issue of race.8 8 It is strongly believed that progress in the area of Black
civil rights and voting participation was obtained due to voting rights laws
and litigation forcing covered jurisdictions to comply with the VRA.89
This was accomplished only through forced compliance by DOJ and the
D.C.D.C.; although the federal courts and DOJ did not work together, the
two took cues from one another. 90 The Supreme Court's affirmation of the
VRA provided DOJ (and D.C.D.C.) with needed direction, including the
authority to preclear electoral changes and voting laws in covered
jurisdictions, and more importantly the power to mandate federal
compliance with the VRA.91 In turn, DOJ contributed to the development
of a compliance process that reflected the policymaking and politics of
92
voting rights in a federal system.
PART II. HISTORY OF PRECLEARANCE & SECTION 5

The implementation of the VRA into a local and state
straightforward due to the unique nature of voting rights,
dispersed administrative power at the local and state levels,
and judicial review at the federal level, and the internal

issue was not
racial politics,
administrative
procedures of

87 Georgia, 411 U.S. 526; The Supreme Court, again in 1980, reaffirmed the constitutionality of
the VRA, Section 5, and a broad interpretation of which electoral changes were subject to Section 5 in
City of Rome v. U.S. (446 U.S. 156, 1980). The Supreme Court, in 1980, reaffirmed the constitutionality
of the VRA, Section 5, and a broad interpretation of which electoral changes were subject to Section 5
in City ofRome v. U.S. (446 U.S. 156, 1980).
88 See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, ColorblindInjustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the
Second Reconstruction 53 (1999); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage
Restrictionand the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (1974); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD,
A VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT IN GEORGIA (2003). "
89 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 76; MCDUFF, supra note 10, at 475; ARDEN ET AL., supra note
14; DAVIDSON & GROFMAN, supra note 21; DAVIS & GRAHAM, supra note 21; PARKER, supra note 22,
at 11; MOORE, supra note 29; TEASLEY, supra note 82; BALL ET AL., supra note 34, at 195;
MCDONALD, supranote 88.
90 MCDONALD, supranote 88; BALL ET AL., supra note 34, at 195; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

91 PARKER, supra note 22; BALL ET AL., supranote 34, at 195, MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.
92 BALL ET AL., supranote 34, at 195; MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.

76

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:1

DOJ.93 Implementing and enforcing civil and voting rights laws required
the committed assertion of the federal government because "[e]fforts to
right past wrongs involved increasingly complex intrusion on state and
local autonomy." 94 The institutional nature and character embedded into
the VRA reflected this reality, and was deemed necessary to counteract the
invidious racial animosity towards Blacks and other minorities trying to
vote in large swaths of the country. 95 As a result, "the radical character of
voting rights policy directly contradicted the usual pattern of American
federalism," 96 and a complicated institutional arrangement was set up
between DOJ voting rights lawyers and the politically elected officials in
covered jurisdictions seeking Section 5 preclearance review. 97 One of the
first major challenges to implement Section 5 in the late 1960s and early
1970s was the limited funds allocated to the Civil Rights Division and the
Voting Section of DOJ; thus, because DOJ did not have the use of a
"financial carrot" to lure or induce states and local jurisdictions into
compliance, 9 8 DOJ operated under the short legislatively mandated 60-day
window to review any submitted electoral changes and respond to a
covered jurisdictions' request for preclearance. Despite not having the
necessary number of field operatives to conduct in-depth investigations and
collect data from covered jurisdictions, DOJ used the language of the law
to mandate compliance. 99 The national government's dramatic assertion
into the interests of a state's and sub-jurisdictions' area of authority made it
clear that the national government was serious about addressing the long
history of racial discrimination in the South, despite the strong political and
public disagreements over the rightfulness and the substance of the VRA
intruding into local affairs.1 00
Initially, due to the political nature of the VRA, its implementation
started slowly as DOI primarily focused on increasing voting registration
rates and removing barriers to the polls on election day while preclearance
remained undefined. 10 1 Although there is no direct evidence, it is safe to
93 BALL ET AL., supra note 34, at 195; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
94

ALICE RIVLIN,

The Evolution of American Federalism in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION, at 82 (Frederick S. Lane ed., 5th ed. 1994).
95 BALL ET AL., supra note 34; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1. Referring to the two types of
preclearance avenues covered jurisdictions could take - administrative via DOJ or through the
D.C.D.C., with appeals going directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

96 BALL ET AL., supra note 34, at 115; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
97 Id.; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

98 BALL ETAL., supra note 34, at 195.
99 Id.
100 BALLET AL., supra note 34, 195.
101 Id. (quoting MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 33).
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say that DOJ was waiting until the Supreme Court determined the Act's
constitutionality, and then defined the types of electoral changes that were
required under Section 5 before DOJ stepped into the politically
controversial role of mandating Section 5 compliance.1 0 2 DOJ was also
encouraged to act due to a convergence of politics, and several
organizations and concerned citizens raising questions, such as the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights,1 03 civil rights organizations, government
attorneys, and congressional oversight; the actions of these groups
compelled DOJ to take a more active role in enforcing all sections of the
VRA, but in particular Section 5.104 As soon as it became obvious that it
was no longer politically feasible to remain inactive, DOJ created a
compliance process that reflected the political reality of covered
jurisdictions and the voting rights of Black citizens. 105 The goals of the
VRA were to ensure jurisdictions' electoral changes were pre-approved via
preclearance to ensure that electoral systems would not discriminate against
Black voters. 106 All electoral changes submitted for judicial review to the
D.C.D.C. or administrative review to DOJ had to demonstrate that the new
electoral practices did "not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
107
denying or abridging the right to vote based on race."
As seen in Part I, Section 5 was read broadly by the Court to include any
voting procedures and practices, changes in the electoral system or
qualifications for party or independent candidates, eligibility or registration
requirements to vote, or changes in voting precincts due to redistricting,
annexation, incorporation, or reapportionment.10 8 The Voting Rights
Section of DOJ devised guidelines to test whether or not any submitted
electoral changes were discriminatory in nature, and focused on
ameliorating the historical racial discriminatory practices used in southern
102 MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.
103 THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, SUMMARY AND TEXT, -United States Commission on Civil Rights, 4

at
available
1971),
September
32,
No.
Publication
(Clearinghouse
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr 11032.pdf.
104 See Clarke, supra note 19, at 385; BALL ET AL., supra note 34 (quoting Middlemass, supra note
1,at 33).
105 BALL ET AL., supranote 34 (quoting Middlemass, supranote 1, at 34); H.M. YOSTE, Section 5:
Growth or Demise of Statutory Voting Rights?, 48 MisS. L.J. 818, 820 (1977).
106 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 89-90; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006); See POSNER, supra note 28.
107 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). POSNER, supranote 28, at 33; Clarke, supra note 19, at 386.
108 Early Section 5 submissions concerned: 1.voter registration procedures and other changes
affecting the individual vote and if the changes hindered minority voters' access to the ballot; 2. vote
dilution; 3. annexation or consolidation changes which decrease a locality's percent of minority voters;
4. polling place changes, and if the change in location were intimidating or inconvenient for minority
voters; 5. at-large election systems in jurisdictions with racially polarized voting patterns; and 6.
redistricting changes that led to over or under-populated minority districts, and if the changes were
See Allen, Perkins, Georgia,and Katzenbach.
retrogressive (Middlemass, supra note 1).
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jurisdictions,109 with three primary goals: 1) prevent the implementation of
discriminatory voting changes through the preclearance process; 2) make
sure that all electoral changes were submitted for preclearance review; and
3) facilitate the implementation of non-discriminatory voting changes in
plans that did not achieve the required preclearance.110 However, the
various political forces that influenced the implementation of the VRA, and
the need for care in implementing a complex administrative national voting
rights policy at the local level, created an environment in which negotiated
settlements between DOJ and some covered jurisdictions were required. 111
The preclearance process that emerged was a form of "compromised
compliance,"11 2 as a broad range of possible responses and voting changes
submitted by state and local officials in covered jurisdictions to DOJ would
be acceptable and granted preclearance. In effect, DOJ created a "zone of
acceptability" to have electoral changes pre-cleared.1 13 This was possible
because the political institutions, Congress and the White House, did not
set the parameters of th review process; therefore, DOJ crafted its own "set
of rules" within the Court's interpretation of Section 5.114 Because DOJ
created an environment in which negotiation was an acceptable and viable
route to achieve compliance, it ensured the effective implementation of the
VRA, and brought local officials into the process rather than setting up an
antagonistic relationship.11 5 From this balancing act emerged a reasonable
approach of prevention and implementation between DOJ's power to
enforce the VRA and its use of techniques to "sting" covered
jurisdictions.1 16 The enforcement of Section 5 reveals that the process was
fluid due to political circumstances, federal court decisions, and Congress'
authority to amend the VRA117 to address current and/or on-going
conditions and circumstances of voting rights in covered jurisdictions. 1188
VRA Amendments, 1970, 1975, 1982 & 2006: Extending Section 5
The Court decisions that followed Katzenbach demonstrated that a broad
109 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
110 Id. at 37 (quoting BALL ET AL., supra note 34); POSNER, supra note 28, at 80-1; DAVIDSON &
GROFMAN, supranote 22.
111 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 39.

112 BALL ET AL., supra note 34 (quoting Middlemass, supra note 1, at 34).
113
114
115
116
117

BALL ET AL., supranote 34; MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1, at 35.
MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 35.
BALL ET AL., supranote 34; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.
BALL ET AL., supranote 34 at 200; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

Id.
118 Congress is granted the power to enforce constitutional amendments, including the Fifteenth
Amendment, which supersedes state power. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334
(1966).
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range of electoral procedures and practices were still in use in covered
jurisdictions; the goal of eliminating discriminatory election practices was
slow, as the Court had to rely on litigation brought on a case-by-case
basis.11 9 It was determined by the Court and others that this process was
unsuccessful at preventing, stopping and overturning racially
discriminatory practices, and "was inadequate to combat wide-spread and
persistent discrimination in voting because of the inordinate amount of time
and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably
encountered in these lawsuits." 120 By 1970, Section 5 had withstood
several constitutional challenges, and although the preclearance provision
was originally meant to expire, the original goals of the VRA had not been
achieved; therefore, Congress extended Section 5 for five additional years
to 1975. When Section 5 was up for renewal in 1975, Congress again
extended it, this time for seven years, to 1982; yet, southern legislators
continued to resist efforts to comply with the VRA and desegregate the
right to vote. Each year, new electoral tactics would emerge and achieve
similar results as the procedures the Court had deemed unconstitutional.
As a result of congressional investigations into the continued irregularities
in voting practices in the South, and in other parts of the country, too,
Congress extended the preclearance measure in Section 5 in 1982 for an
additional 25 years.121
Congress recognized the continued need for preclearance based on
extensive testimony about the use of electoral practices and procedures
designed to prevent newly registered Black voters from voting; 122
amending the VRA in 1970 reaffirmed the Act's original purpose,
reiterated the national government's commitment to achieving racial
equality in the voting booth, and validated the Supreme Court's broad
scope of Section 5 despite some pushback from the Nixon Administration
and the U.S. Attorney General, John Mitchell, who both wanted to abandon
the coverage formula known as the "trigger mechanism" in Section 4(b) so
that the VRA would apply nationwide.1 23 The Nixon Administration felt
that the "trigger mechanism" subjected southern states to arbitrary
punishment that inhibited voting rights reforms. 124
119 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 107-108, 110.
120 South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).
121 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 105-112.
122 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro b.php (last visited May 31, 2015).
123 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1. Recall, Section 4(b) determines the states and political
subdivisions "covered" by the VRA and subject to preclearance.
124 Id., supranote 1; BALL ET AL., supranote 34.

80

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS &ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol.28:1

Despite the Administration's disagreement with its counter-part,
Congress adopted a new coverage formula, expanding Section 4(b) to
include the November 1968 elections to determine which jurisdictions were
to be covered by Section 5.125 The new coverage formula included the
original language from 1965 regarding whether or not covered jurisdictions
used a test or device during the five preceding years to determine who was
eligible to vote, as well as the requirement for covered jurisdictions to
retain their voter registration rolls and data on electoral participation and
turn out based on race; such evidence was used by DOJ and the D.C.D.C.
during preclearance to determine if the states' actions had for the purpose
or the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.126 The 1970 Amendments resulted in the partial coverage of ten
127
additional states.
When Section 5 came up for renewal in 1975, Congress followed the
same script as in 1970, holding a series of congressional hearings and
collecting evidentiary testimony; these efforts exposed the discriminatory
electoral practices used against other minority groups, including Latinos,
Asians and Native American citizens, as well as language minorities. 128
With confirmation and verification that jurisdictions were discriminating
widely against minority groups across the country, Congress amended the
VRA and Section 4(b) to include language-minorities; 129 this Amendment
covered the entire country.
Consequently, covered and non-covered
jurisdictions in which a single language minority was more than five
percent of eligible voters or where the illiteracy rate within a single
language minority was higher than the national average were required to
conduct bilingual elections and registration campaigns.130 Jurisdictions
captured by the 1975 Amendments included numerous states and over 200
counties in several other states. 13 1
125 The previous coverage formula to determine which states were covered by the Act used voting
turnout and registration data from the 1964 presidential election (Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, August 6, 1965).
126 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a).
127 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1; POSNER, supra note 28. The 1970 Amendments included: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Wyoming. Half of these states have since used the "bail out" provisions in Section Four - Connecticut,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wyoming).
128 H.R. 6219, 94" Cong. § 1973 (1975).
129 52 U.S.C. § 10310c(3) (2014) (defining 'language minorities' or 'language minority group' as
persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage).
130 MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1, at 105-107.
131 POSNER, supra note 28 (stating that states that were entirely covered by the 1975 language

amendments included: Alaska, Arizona, and Texas; states that had counties covered by the 1975
language amendments include: California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina and South
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In 1975, Congress updated the coverage formula and "trigger
mechanism" in Section 4(b) to include the 1972 elections as the basis to
determine covered states. 132 The 1975 Amendments were extended for
seven years, to 1982, in anticipation of the 1980 Census; it was expected
that covered jurisdictions incorporate updated Census information
concerning language minorities and other demographic changes into their
redistricting plans and other electoral changes when submitting documents
for preclearance.1 33 The 1970 and 1975 Amendments refined the meaning
of Section 5, and clarified Congress' legislative intent for how the VRA
was to be implemented going forward; Congress explicitly endorsed an
expansive reading of Section 5 to continue to protect minority voters in
covered jurisdictions in the South and language minorities in other areas of
34
the country. 1
The debate surrounding the 1982 Amendments focused again on
Sections 4(b) and 5; these two Sections were the most controversial aspects
of the VRA, so debate raged on over whether or not the coverage formula
and therefore Section 5 should be maintained and extended, or
dismantled.13 5 This was not a new debate: Each of the previous times that
Section 5 came up for renewal, there was fiery and intense opposition
against the continued use of the coverage formula and preclearance
requirements; covered jurisdictions resented the federal intrusion and
oversight, and always posed the same question about whether or not the
requirements were still necessary.1 36 Despite the on-going debate over
racial inequality in the electoral process, the importance of voting rights in
a democracy, and states' rights in a federal system, Congress was able to
overcome the political hurdles and extend Section 5; however, in 1982, a
new dispute was inserted into the debate, and shifted the conversation in an
attempt to address what the overall objective of the VRA was, guaranteed
37
equal opportunity for voters or equal results in the outcome of elections?1
President Reagan and his DOJ weighed in on the debate, arguing that the
VRA had served its purpose and it was time to let the temporary
provisions, Section 4(b) and Section 5, expire as they were originally
intended in 1965; "however, political necessity ensured that the Act was

Dakota).

h

132 H.R. 6219, 94 Cong. § 1973 (1975).
133 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1; POSNER, supra note 28.

134 POSNER, supranote at 28; MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 105-107.
135 Id., supra note 1, at 107-109.
136 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

137 Id., supranote 1, at 108.
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extended, as the House and Senate Judiciary Committees' review [of
evidentiary material and testimony during congressional hearings] found a
continued need for Section Five coverage." 138 Furthermore, "Congress
determined that the existing federal anti-discrimination laws were
[in]sufficient to [surmount the continued] resistance of [southern] state
officials to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment." 139
Congressional committees noted that progress had been made regarding
minority political representation and that racial discrimination at the polls
was declining, but that minority voters continued to face and encounter
problems when trying to vote in covered jurisdictions.14 0 Accordingly,
Congress retained the preclearance requirements, but extended Section 5
for an additional 25 years in 1982 to 2007. The Reagan Administration
vigorously opposed the continuation of Section 5; however, experts argued
that without preclearance or the ability to take a covered jurisdiction to
federal court (e.g. D.C.D.C.), southern jurisdictions would enact new
voting schemes to wipe out or slow down the progress made in minority
voter turn-out and electoral representation since the passage of the VRA.141
However, one concession made to the Reagan Administration was that
Congress did not change the "trigger mechanism" in Section 4(b); the 1972
election results and voter registration data remained as the basis to
determine which states would be covered by Section 5, which was in line
with Congress' intent in 1965 to eventually have the temporary measures
expire.142 It was believed that if the 1976 or 1980 election results were
incorporated into the 1982 Amendments, additional states would be
captured, and that an extensive or national preclearance measure would be
impractical and maybe even unconstitutional.1 43 The other significant
change in the 1982 Amendments was the bailout formula, which had
previously applied to entire states but not covered sub-jurisdictions, such as
counties. 144 The 1982 Amendments allowed sub-jurisdictions to bailout if
it was able to meet all of the requirements regardless of the jurisdiction's
original coverage or if it was in a state that was entirely covered. 145
138 Id., supra note 1,at 108; LISA ERICKSON, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Criticism of the
Justice Department in Miller v. Johnson, 65 MISS.L.J. 409, 412 (1995).
139 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1,at108.
140 Id., supranote 1,at108.
141 Id., supranote 1,at 110.
142 Id., supra note 1,at162.
143 Id., supranote 1, at 108; ERICKSON, supra note 138, at 412.
144 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1, at 108-109.
145 Id., supra note 1, at 108-09. See POSNER, supranote at 28. The first bailout action filed under
the 1982 bailout standards was brought in 1997 by the City of Fairfax, Virginia. In Virginia,
independent cities are the functional equivalent of counties, and possess the same authority over voter
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In 2006, the VRA came up for debate prior to its 2007 expiration date,
and despite political challenges, Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act
"to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote, including the right to register
to vote and cast meaningful votes, is preserved and protected as guaranteed
by the Constitution:"1 4 6 The temporary provision, Section 5, was part of
the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, Cesar E. Chavez,
Barbara Jordan, William Velazquez and Dr. Hector Garcia Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act.' 4 7 Congress and experts
argued that for five decades Section 5 has been: an effective tool to
overcome Whites' resistance to implementing the Fifteenth Amendment;1 4 8
a valuable weapon against Jim Crow;' 49 a successful instrument to
eradicate racially discriminatory voting practices and electoral
procedures; 50 and has been constructive at preventing the introduction of
discriminatory voting practices and biased tests or devices from going into
effect, which ensured continued minority participation at the polls.'15
However, Congress documented hundreds of objections interposed by DOI
since 1982; increased numbers of declaratory judgments denied by the
D.C.D.C.; and continued litigation pursued by DOJ under Section 2.152
Despite significant progress being made to eliminate first generation
barriers experienced by minority voters, and "this progress [being] the
direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"153 vestiges of

registration and elections as counties do in other parts of the South. DOJ consented to the declaratory
judgment, which was entered on October 21, 1997, for the City of Fairfax. MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1,
at 109, n. 88.
146 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 at 2(a) (Congressional
Purpose).
147 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Voting Sec., History of Federal Voting Rights Laws:
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, available at http://www.justicegov/crt/about/vot/intro/introb.php.
Signed into law by George W. Bush on July 27, 2006. Id.
148 U.S. CONST. amendment XV (the right to vote cannot be denied on the basis of race); NETA
LEVANON, The Ascendancy of Associational Freedoms. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and Political
Party Delegate Allocation, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 848, 882 n. 180 (2011); JAMES THOMAS TUCKER, The

Politics of Persuasion:Passageof the Voting Rights Act ReauthorizationAct of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205,
221(2007); ENBAR TOLEDANO, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and Its Place in "Post-Racial"
America, 61 EMORY L.J. 389, 391 (2012); TRAVIS CRUM, The Voting Rights Act's Secret Weapon:
Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2000 n. 32 (2010);
MICHAEL J. PITTS, Georgia v. Ashcroft: It's the End of Section 5 As We Know It (andI Feel Fine), 32
PEPP. L. REV. 265, 266 (2005); MYRNA PEREZ & VISHAL AGRAHARKER, If Section 5 Falls:New Voting
Implications, THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE ANALYSIS 1 (2013), available at

http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Section-5-New-Votinglmplications.pdf.
149 PARKER, supranote 22.

150 PITTS, supra note 148, at 275.
151

MIDDLEMASS, supranote 1.

152 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 at 2(b)(4)(A-D)
(Congressional Findings).
153 Id. at 2(b)(l) (Congressional Findings).
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discrimination embedded in second generation barriers were now
preventing minority voters from participating in the electoral process; thus,
racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable and warranted
continued protection under the VRA.154 Therefore, Congress argued, the
evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the continued need for federal
oversight in covered jurisdictions. Congress extended Section 5 for an
additional 25 years, and kept in place the need for covered jurisdictions to
submit their electoral changes to DOJ for preclearance or the D.C.D.C.
55
before implementing any voting or electoral changes. 1
Although there was some muted dispute about extending Section 5, the
2006 Amendments were not controversial: "The extension of the temporary
provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act sailed through Congress and was
signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 27, 2006 without
major turbulence."' 56 The 2006 Amendments and Reauthorization of the
VRA was a welcoming event in comparison to the contentious past, which
was probably due to a confluence of factors: Bipartisan support in the U.S.
House and Senate; a strong push from the Bush Administration to get the
Amendments done; the reality that demographic changes in the electorate
made challenging the extension a political non-starter for many
politicians;1 57 and the fact that conservative opposition in covered
jurisdictions was muted, as any political unrest arguing to dismantle
Section 5 was muffled by leadership. 158
Each set of Amendments to the VRA were political statements about the
importance of the Act's original purpose, to protect and ensure minority
political participation; when Congress had the opportunity to amend the
VRA in response to the federal courts' interpretation of the statutory
language or political pressure from the White House or constituents, it
choose to do so incrementally, as Congress could not (or was unwilling) to
put together the needed legislative majorities to dismantle the temporary
provisions, namely Sections 4(b) and 5. As a result, the Amendments to
the Act were a response to and the product of the federal courts making
important decisions about the constitutionality of the VRA and how it was
to be interpreted; Congress then "approved" those decisions by reaffirming
the Act by extending the most important, and controversial, provisions of

154 Id. at 2(b)(3) (Congressional Findings).
155

MOORE, supranote 29, at 106; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; 28 C.F.R. §51.10 (2011).

156 TUCKER, supranote 148, at 205 no. 2.
157 Id., supra note 148, at 206.
158 Id., supra note 148, at 206.
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the VRA.159 The analysis and description of the amendments to the VRA
provides some insight in how Congress viewed the legislative intent of the
1965 Act, and reaffirms its continued importance in protecting minority
voting rights.
Section 5 Comes Under Assault by the FederalCourts
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the 1957 U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights160 gathered information on voting rights,
discrimination in voting due to race, and the hostile environment in which
Black voters found themselves; because previous laws proved to be
ineffective and inadequate at protecting Black voting rights, 16 1 the VRA
and its extensive and extraordinary provisions were needed to protect the
voting rights of all American citizens. 162 Since, the political landscape has
noticeably changed in terms of implementing the Fifteenth Amendment,
providing racial and language minorities' unfettered access to the ballot,
and expanding the opportunity for racial and ethnic minorities to run for
and win political office. 163 This was only possible because the VRA was a
radical departure from prior voting rights laws, was purposely enacted to
eliminate discriminatory voting practices and procedures, 164 and because
the extraordinary measures written into the Act were interpreted as
constitutionally sound by the federal courts, extended by Congress, and
implemented by DOJ.
Preclearance was considered the "front line defense against voting
discrimination" 165 because it was designed to prevent, rather than just
combat, the use of old voting procedures and the emergence of new

159 MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

160 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE, PL 85-315, September 9, 1957, 71 Stat. 634
161 H.R. REP. 109-478, 6-7, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 621, at 7 (noting that the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 was prompted by the failure of 1957, 1960, and 1964 civil rights laws aimed at enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment).
162 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. 89-110; GARRINE P. LANEY, The Voting Rights Act of 1965,
As Amended: Its History and Current Issues, CRS Report for Congress, available at
http://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/95-896.txt. (2008).
163 SABINA JACOBS, The Voting Rights Act: What Is the Basisfor the Section 5 Baseline?,42 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 575, 575 (2009); CHRISTOPHER F. MORIARTY, The Demise of the Voting Rights Act?: A

Preview of Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One v. Holder, 4 DUKE JOURNAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

&

PUBLIC

POLICY

SIDEBAR

459,

459

(2009),

available

at

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp_sidebar/52; ELLEN D. KATZ & ANNA BALDWIN, Why Counting
Votes Doesn't Add Up: A Response to Cox and Miles' Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 23, 23 (2008).

164 JACOBS, supra note 163 at 575.
165 CLARK, supra note 19, at 181; S. REP. 94-295, 1, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 774.
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discriminatory voting practices. 16 6 But, supporters of the VRA began to
worry about changes in the Court's composition, and the effects new
personnel would have on questioning and challenging the VRA's
constitutional validity and Congress' power to extend it. For instance, the
overall effectiveness of the VRA since 1982 was undermined by Supreme

Court decisions Reno v. Bossier Parish JJ167 and Georgia v. Ashcrof, 168

which Members of Congress argued in the 2006 Reauthorization debate
"have misconstrued Congress' original intent in enacting the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections afforded by Section 5 of the
Act." 169 The biggest change came when Georgia v. Ashcroft scaled back
Congress' ability to exercise its broad latitude to do almost anything it
wished when it came to civil and voting rights legislation. 170 These two

cases were alarming; in the previous decade, Congress seemingly had
limitless power to subject states and sub-political jurisdictions to a range of
social and economic policies under the Commerce Clause and the

Fourteenth Amendment, 17 1 but the Court moved to constrain and reduce
federal power and authority over the states. 172 One troubling development
was the Court's disposition to slow down the momentum of federal and
173
congressional oversight of civil and voting rights.
Under Chief Justice, Rehnquist in the 1990s, the Supreme Court showed
166 JACOBS, supranote 163 at 577.
167 Reno v. Bossier ParishSch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) ("Bossier ParishI1").
The Court held that
Section 5 language and Beer's holding did not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with
a discriminatory purpose - covered jurisdictions must establish that proposed changes do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color. The covered jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion on both points. See Reno v. Bossier
ParishSch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) ("Bossier ParishT').
168 In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), the Supreme Court held that the U.S. District
court did not consider all of the obligatory and relevant factors when reviewing Georgia's original
redistricting plan that resulted in retrogression of Black voters' effective exercise of the right to vote.
The Court thought that minority voters could cast an effective vote when minority voters are spread
over a greater number of districts, creating more districts in which minority voters can have the
opportunity, but not a certainty of electing a candidate of their choice. The Court rules that such a
strategy would increase substantive representation, and undermine Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976).
169 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 at 2(b)(5-6) (Congressional
Findings).
170 See PITrS,supra note 148; see GEOFFREY LANDWARD, Note and Comments, Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrettand the Equal Education Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites
the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC.& L. J.313.
171 See LANDWARD, supra note 170; JAMES LEONARD, Symposium: The American with
Disabilities Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective: The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New
Federalism May Affect the Anti- DiscriminationMandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52
ALA. L. REv. 91, 92 (Fall 2000).
172 See LEONARD, supranote 171; See also THEODORE W. RUGER, Introduction:New Federalism,
16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 89, 89 (2004).
173 RUGER, supranote 172.
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a strong willingness to defer to a states' right to determine its own civil and
voting rights laws if it was able to demonstrate a compelling state interest
that supported

its

actions. 174

Court

decisions

involved reducing

congressional reach in areas associated with "conservative" substantive
politics, where states' rights were invoked in the name of protecting state
sovereignty.1 75 As the Court became more conservative during George W.
Bush's term in office (2001-2008),176 limited federal authority and
decentralized state decision making have been applied to a range of social
and economic policies. 177 The Court hastened a debate over the proper role
of the federal government and state sovereignty, and the political and legal
arguments focused on re-calibrating the allocation of federal authority
interfering in a state's power to govern its own electoral processes.
With regards to the right to vote, the question of national power and state
sovereignty has altered since the Constitutional Convention; states began
with all of the power over voting rights, even after the Civil War, until the
passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.178 The jurisdictional tensions
developed because the right to vote is not an integral part of the original
U.S. Constitution; it is protected by several constitutional amendmentsl79
and federal statutes that support the implementation of those Amendments,
180 but the right to vote is historically a state issue. 18 1 Federal laws and
174 See LANDWARD, supra note 170; See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Forecasting the Future of
Federalism,TRIAL, July 2001, at 18.
175 RUGER, supra note 172, at 91.
176 e.g. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding the winner
and loser of the 2000 presidential election, and the certification of Florida's presidential election results.
The 7-2 decision determined that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme to recount ballots was
unconstitutional as different ballot standards were applied across ballots, precincts and counties, and
there was not enough time for a "constitutionally sound" recount. Because of the procedural difficulties
in implementing such a recount, the Court ruled 5-4 that the Supreme Court of Florida had violated the
U.S. Constitution and that the recount was tainted by shifting methods of vote-counting, which violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ordered the recount
abandoned, and named George W. Bush the winner of Florida's electoral votes, and therefore the
winner of the Electoral College. The decision seemed particularly partisan; the interests of the
conservative candidate went against the traditional conservative principles of "states' rights." See
RUGER, supra note 172; See JOHN BRIGHAM, New Federalism: Unusual Punishment: The Federal
Death Penalty in the United States, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 202 (2004).
177 See RUGER, supra note 172; LANDWARD, supra note 170; PITTS, supra note 148.
178 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR. 2000. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States. New York, NY: Basic Books; See MICHAEL PERMAN. 2001. Struggle for Mastery:
Disenfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908. Chapel Hill: UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS;
McDonald, supra note 84.
179 U.S. CONST. amendment XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S.
CONSt. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; See also The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (abolishing literacy tests); and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (holding that poll taxes were unconstitutional in federal, state and local elections);
180 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301 et seq.; National Voter Registration Act of 1993;
52 U.S.C. 20501 et seq.; Help America Vote Act of 2002; 52 U.S.C. 20901 et seq.
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policies arose only when state actions were so egregious that the federal
government could no longer stand by and watch (e.g. Civil War and the
Civil Rights Movement).1 82 But, in the area of voting rights in a
democracy, who regulates the right to vote is and has been problematic in
the United States. Voting rights and the manifest of political power in the
hands of local institutions, particularly in the South, was the result of
slavery and its successors, Black Codes and Jim Crow, which used race to
govern all social, economic and political interactions. 183 The color line in
the South was the defining issue on who could access the ballot and voting
rights, 8 4 which made the role of the U.S. Supreme Court paramount in
protecting the right to vote by finding the VRA and its implementation
constitutional.
In a system of government that is a mix of local, state, and national
sovereignty, with multiple levels of government with different
responsibilities that overlap over constitutional, political, social, economic
and geographical jurisdictions and legal spaces on a continuous basis,
questions of "power" are bound to be raised:1 85 The allocation of federal
and state power is an on-going political debate, and there may never be a
"correct" allocation of power within one policy area that fits the political
86
needs of each government within the American federal system.1
Congress, pursuant to implementing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, explicitly wrote provisions to ensure there would be no
"backsliding" with regards to minority voting rights and the
implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment; by 2006, these issues were no
longer in dispute:' 8 7 Section 5, from its passage and through its subsequent
reauthorizations, was understood to force electoral compliance of states and

181 KEYSSAR, supra note 178.
182 BRIGHAM, supra note 176; See also LEONARD, supra note 171; LANDWARD, supra note 170.
183 KEYSSAR, supra note 178; ROBERT LIEBERMAN. 2005. Shaping Race Policy: The United States
in ComparativePerspective. PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS; PERMAN, supra note 178;
PARKER, supra note 22.

184 See HERBERT BLUMER. 1965. The Future of the Color Line; The South in Continuity and

Change, edited by John McKinney & Edgar Thompson, 322-336. Durham, NC: DUKE UNIVERSITY

PRESS; MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, 1991; The Colorof Politics in the United States: White Supremacy as the
Main Explanation for the Peculiarities of American Politicsfrom Colonial Times to the Present, THE
BOUNDS OF RACE: PERSPECTIVES ON HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE, edited by DOMINICK LACAPRA,

104-133. Ithaca, NY: CORNELL UNIV. PRESS; Key, V. 0., JR. 1949; Southern Politics in State and
Nation. New York: Knopf.
185 BRIGHAM, supranote 176, discussing the expansion of federal power in the policy areas of the
death penalty, Commerce Clause, the environment, abortion rights, civil liberties, and civil rights.
186

BRIGHAM, supra note 176.

187 AKHIL REED AMAR, The Lawfulness ofSection 5 - and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F.
109 (2013).
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other covered jurisdictions to come into agreement with the VRA.188
However, individuals still question what the "proper" role of the VRA and
Section 5 are in reference to its original purpose and the current political

climate; only the coverage formula in Section 4(b), which is used to apply
Section 5, and the bailout provision have fundamentally changed since
1965.189

In different eras, the Court has given states a lot of latitude to determine
and decide what is "best" for its citizens, and an open question remainswhat is the scope and proper role of federal and state authority? A related
question revolves around which entity, the Court or Congress, is the proper
arbiter for the boundaries of federal law when it concerns the right to vote.
Recent court decisions concerning Section 5 suggest that the Court has
deemed itself the proper institution to overrule Congress and reinterpret
legislative history to tilt the federal-state balance of power back in the
states' direction, which effectively strips Congress of its role in passing
voting rights legislation.190 With the Court's shift towards granting states
more rights, it has undermined the federal role in protecting minority
voting rights, and this is no more evident than in Shelby County v. Holder.
PART III: SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER

Shelby County arose because of an earlier court case challenging the
2006 Amendments and Reauthorization of the VRA; in August, 2006, a
water district in Austin, Texas, filed a federal lawsuit challenging
Congress' authority to reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA. In Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,19 1 the small utility

district had an elected board that was subject to preclearance if any changes
were made to its electoral system or election process. The utility district
sought relief under the "bailout" provision in Section 4(a) of the VRA; the
1982 Amendments allowed political sub-jurisdictions to be released -from
Section 5 preclearance requirements if it met all of the conditions. The
utility district argued that if it was ineligible for bailout under Section 4(a),
then Section 5 was unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court rejected both
188 JACOBS, supra note 163, at 577; MORIARTY, supra note 163.
189 CRUM, supra note 148; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, June 19, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-285, 84 Stat. 314; PL 94-73 (HR 6219), PL 94-73, August 6, 1975, 89 Stat 400; PL 97-205 (HR
3112), PL 97-205, JUNE 29, 1982, 96 Stat 131; Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, July 27, 2006, Pub. L. No.f 109-246,
120 Star. 577.
190 LANDWARD, supra note 170; See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 174; RUGER, supra note 172;
PITTS, supra note 148.
191 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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claims, arguing that Section 4(a) only applies to counties, parishes or
political subunits that register voters; therefore, because the utility district
did not register its own voters it was not an eligible entity to "bailout" from
preclearance.
The District Court also concluded that the 2006
Amendments to the VRA extending Section 5 for 25 years were
constitutional. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility DistrictNo. 1 appealed
the U.S. District Court decision, and when the U.S. Supreme Court heard
the case, it held in an 8-1 decision that: 192
the historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable,
but the Act now raises serious constitutional concerns. The preclearance
requirement represents an intrusion into areas of state and local
responsibility that is otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system. Some of
the conditions that the Court relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach1 93 and City of Rome v. United States 94
have unquestionably improved. Those improvements are no doubt due in
significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and stand as a monument to
its success, but the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by
current needs. The Act also differentiates between the States in ways that
95
may no longer be justified.1
In Northwest Austin, the Supreme Court did not rule on the
constitutionality of the VRA, arguing that "[o]ur usual practice is to avoid
the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions;"1 96 however, the
Supreme Court did find that the utility district was eligible under the VRA
to seek bailout from Section 5,197 reversing the District Court's decision
while not addressing the second question concerning the constitutionality
of Section 5 and whether Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 was a
valid exercise of congressional power. Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas, in a concurring judgment and dissent, argued that the Court
should have addressed the constitutionality of Section 5 in Northwest
Austin, criticizing the Court for not speaking to that issue. He went on to
192 Id., Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part: In his dissent, Thomas argued that
even if the Court resolves the district's statutory argument in its favor, the constitutional question must
still be raised and answered. Id. at 212.
193 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
194 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
195 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. 193.
196 Id. at 197.
197 The Court reasoned that the language of Section 4(a) and the bailout provision did not constrict
political subunits like the utility district from bailing out of Section 5 coverage. Moreover, the Court
also argued that as only 17 of the 12,000 jurisdictions covered by Section 5 had bailed out suggested
that Congress never intended the bailout measure to be so stringent and difficult for jurisdictions to
bailout. Id. at 207.
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argue that he thought that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment when it extended Section 5 in 2006;
Thomas' dissent set up a future judgment day to determine the
constitutionality of the two most important provisions of the VRA, Section
4(b) and Section 5.
The significance of Northwest Austin is that the Court held that Section 5
and the coverage formula of the VRA "imposes substantial federalism
costs" and "differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition
that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty,"1 98 and that "things have
changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels."1 99 In Northwest
Austin, the Court questioned whether the problems that Section 5 was
meant to address were still a concern in the jurisdictions singled out for
preclearance. 2 00 As a result of these questions, it was clear that Justices on
the Supreme Court had "serious misgivings about the constitutionality of
§5"201 and suggested that "its coverage formula [in Section 4(b)] raise[s]
serious constitutional questions." 202 In Northwest Austin, the Court stated
that it had resolved the utility districts' challenge on statutory grounds,
granting the utility district "bailout" from Section 5, but expressed grave
203
doubts about the VRA's continued constitutionality.
The Justices' statements Northwest Austin imply the Court was in the
mood to find Section 5 unconstitutional, but was not given the appropriate
circumstances to address that specific question. 204 Instead, the Court made
clear three specific issues: the coverage formula based on data that is more
than 35 years old did not consider current political conditions, including
significant changes in the South and the fact that voter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity; Section 5 in 2009 goes beyond the
implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment; 205 and that although the VRA
has been a monumental success, past successes are not adequate
198 Northwest Austin, at 202-3.
199 Id. at 203.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 202.
202 Id. at 204.
203 See Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility DistrictNo. One
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193.
204 The Court cited Northwest Austin more than thirty times in Shelby County, and there were only
a few new pages inserted in the majority opinion. Sections I and II of Northwest Austin are strikingly
similar to Sections I, II and III in Shelby County. The new material specifically addressed the issues and
arguments raised by Shelby County, Alabama, the government and the dissenting opinion.
205 Id. at 202.
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justification to retain the preclearance requirements of Section 5.206
A year after Northwest Austin,207 the Court was given its chance when a
largely white suburb of Birmingham, Alabama, filed suit in federal court
seeking to have Section 5 declared unconstitutional. Taking up Justice
Thomas' call to find Section 5 unconstitutional, Shelby County, Alabama,
in 2010, claimed that Congress' extension of Section 5 in 2006 was
unconstitutional because Congress did not have the authority to reauthorize
Section 5 of the VRA. Shelby County, Alabama, went to federal court
seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of Sections
4(b), the "trigger mechanism," and Section 5, preclearance.
At trial, the U.S. District Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5,
finding that Congress, in 2006, reviewed sufficient evidentiary material to
justify reauthorization of Section 5 and the continuation of Section 4(b)'s
coverage formula. The D.C.D.C. affirmed the decision, upholding the
constitutionality of Section 5, and concluding that Congress acted
appropriately in 2006 but that Section 2208 litigation remained an
inadequate measure to protect minority voting rights. Therefore, Section 5
was still necessary, and that meant that the coverage formula in Section
4(b) passed constitutional muster, too. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed; after extensive review and analysis of the record,2 09 the Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted Congress' conclusion that Section 2 remained
inadequate and Section 5 was still necessary in covered jurisdictions to
Shelby County, Alabama,
protect minority voters' voting rights. 210
2
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 11
2
In Shelby County v. Holder, 12 the Court noted the historic importance of
the VRA, and remarked that "exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate," 2 13 but the unprecedented nature of
those measures were to expire after five years.2 14 The Court continued,
stating that "[n]early 50 years later, they are still in effect; indeed, they
have been made more stringent, and are now scheduled to last until
206 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. 193; See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004).
207 557 U.S. 193.
208 52 U.S.C. §10301(a), bans any "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen.., to vote on account of race or color;" is a permanent provision
of the VRA and is applied nationwide.
209 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612.
210 Id.
at 865-73.
211 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2612.
212 133 S.Ct.2612(2013).
213 Id. at 2618 (citing South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966)).
214 Id. at 2615; Voting Rights Act of 1965, §4(a), Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438.
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The Court was fixated on how Section 5 was initially a
2031 ."215
temporary provision set to expire after five years, in 1970, but that it had
been reauthorized several times, the last being 2006 for an additional 25
years, so it had been operating as a permanent feature of the VRA. "There
is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these
216
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions."
The Court conceded that "voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts
that. The question is whether the Act's extraordinary measures, including
its disparate treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional
requirements. As we put it a short time ago, 'the Act imposes current
2 17
burdens and must be justified by current needs."'
Most importantly, however, the Court narrowed in on how the coverage
formula, Section 4(b), had not changed since 1982, and that it still relied on
whether or not a jurisdiction used a voting test or device in the 1972
elections and if the same jurisdiction had low Black voter registration
and/or turnout. The Court deemed that the 1982 Amendments, when
Congress reauthorized Section 5 for 25 years but did not make any changes
to the coverage formula in Section 4(b)218 and amended the bailout
provisions in Section 4(a) allowing political subdivisions of covered
220
2 9
jurisdictions to bailout of Section 5 preclearance, 1 were constitutional.
When referring to Northwest Austin, the Court argued that the "'underlying
constitutional concerns,' among other things, 'compelled a broader reading
of the bailout provision,' we construed the statute to allow the utility
district to seek bailout," 22 1 but that broader reading did not apply to the
2006 Amendments, the Court's real focus in Shelby County.
The 2006 Amendments and the coverage formula that determined which
states and sub-jurisdictions were subject to preclearance had not changed
since 1982; the Court went on to state that when Congress reauthorized
Section 5 in 2006 for an additional 25 years, without any changes to its
coverage formula, 222 it was prohibiting more conduct than before,
215 Id. at 2618.
216 Id. at 2618.
217 Id. at 2619 (citing Northwest Austin Municipal Utility DistrictNo. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. at 203
(2009).
218 Voting Rights Act Amendments, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
219 52 U.S.C. §10304(a) (allows jurisdictions to earn exemption from coverage by satisfying a
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that, in the previous
ten years, they have not used a test or device "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color").
220 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2620.
221 Id. (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 207).
222 Id at 2616.
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forbidding "voting changes with 'any discriminatory purpose' as well as
voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race,
color, or language minority status, 'to elect their preferred candidates of
choice."223
The Court noted that Congress and the country had witnessed significant
progress in eliminating first generation voting rights barriers preventing
minorities from accessing the ballot, that the changes included increased
minority voter registration, voter turnout, and representation in Congress,
state legislatures and local elected office, 2 2 4 and reasoned that the progress
and improvements in minority voting rights was "in large part because of
the Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at
redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting process." 225
"Yet, the Act has neither eased the restrictions in §5 nor narrowed the
scope of the coverage formula in §4(b) along the way. Those extraordinary
and unprecedented features were reauthorized-as if nothing had
changed." 226 "Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and
low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such
tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years." 22 7 Therefore, the
Court argued, Section 4 of the VRA was unconstitutional due to the "age of
the coverage formula" (e.g. 1972 election results), and that when Congress
had the opportunity to update the coverage formula in 2006, it choose not
to do so; therefore, the Supreme Court argued just because ".... voting
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The question is whether the
VRA's extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the
22 8
States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements."
While striking down an Act of Congress "is the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform," 229 the Court deemed
that it was appropriate to do so in 2013 because Congress failed to update
the coverage formula. This failure to act left the Court in the position of
having no choice but to declare §4(b) unconstitutional; with these few
words, the Court overturned the lower courts, holding that Section 4(b) of
the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional, declaring that Section 4(b) was
223 Id. at 2621. See 52 U.S.C. §10301(b)-(d).
224 Shelby Cnty., at 14; See §2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577; See the House Report on increased registration,
voters and representation in H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 12 (2006). See McDuff, supranote 10.
225 Shelby Cnty., at 14. See §2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577.
226 Shelby Cnty., at 14.
227 Id.; See §6, 84 Stat. 315; § 102, 89 Stat. 400.
228 Shelby County v. Holder 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
229 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927).
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no longer valid because the statutory language did not take into account the
political changes that have occurred in terms of racial politics since the
provision was last been amended in 1975.230 The Court undermined
Section 4(b), and chastised the inaction of Congress to fix the coverage
formula in Section 4(b), noting that the current evidence about voting rights
of minority voters was satisfactory to overturn §4(b). The Court declared
that Congress had the power to draft another coverage formula based on
current conditions, but that a determination of exceptional conditions must
justify such an extraordinary departure from the traditional federal-state
relationship. 2 31 Therefore, the Court determined that Section 4(b)'s
"trigger mechanism" and coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis
for determining and subjecting jurisdictions to Section 5 preclearance. The
Court single-handedly concluded that covered jurisdictions no longer had
to go to DOJ or the D.C.D.C. to preclear their voting and electoral changes
because the nature of determining a covered jurisdiction was deemed
unconstitutional.
In Shelby County, when the Court had an opportunity to review the
constitutionality of the Act's main provision, Section 5, it passed. In a
close 5-4 decision, the Court did not address the constitutionality of Section
5 itself but Justice Thomas, in his concurring dissent, did, arguing that the
Court should have gone further and found §5 unconstitutional. Instead, the
Court undermined Section 5 by attacking the "trigger mechanism" and
coverage formula in Section 4(b). By finding the coverage formula
unconstitutional, the Court was able to void Section 5 but without declaring
it unconstitutional: If there is no coverage formula, there are no covered
jurisdictions that are required to submit their electoral changes to DOJ or
the D.C.D.C. Section 5 only exists in partnership with Section 4(b); thus,
preclearance has no practical use or effect at this time, but it is interesting
that the Court left the door open for Congress to amend Section 4(b) by
leaving Section 5 intact. The result, however, is the same; formerly
covered states and political jurisdictions within those states have begun
changing their electoral laws, and because Section 5 is no longer there to
prevent the passage and implementation of racially discriminatory voting
laws from being enacted in states with a long history of discriminatory

230 In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven years, until 1982, and used voting turnout and
registration in 1972 as the determinant to determine which jurisdictions were covered under Section 5.
In 1982, and again in 2006, when the Act was reauthorized, Congress did not change the coverage
formula, and continued to use the 1972 presidential election results as the indicator for preclearance.
See Pub. L. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975).
231

Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); See Presley, 502 U. S., at 500-501.
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practices, the new laws are the reason why Section 5 needs to be
resurrected.
PART IV. POST-SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER

Historically, voting rights policy and its implementation involved
institutions and political actors whose goals were not the same by relying
on federal intervention and state compliance. Other national policy
initiatives within a federal system as large as America's tend more towards
policy centralization while relying heavily on sub-national governmental
implementation. 2 32 With voting rights, however, the political dynamics
created by the VRA generated an odd assortment of institutional actors and
hierarchical relationships between national institutions and state
jurisdictions, while giving the U.S. Supreme Court considerable power to
enforce and interpret the VRA over the years.2 33 The institutional
arrangements have had important consequences for the implementation of
Section 5 by DOJ and the D.C.D.C. Prior to Shelby County, the Court was
critical in preventing the continued implementation of hundreds of
discriminatory electoral changes, and supported a broad reading of the
VRA so that DOJ could use Section 5 and its preclearance power as a
deterrent for covered jurisdictions, and it worked; some states never
submitted their changes for preclearance because they knew the laws had
the intent and purpose to discriminate and wanted to avoid having their
electoral changes denied preclearance. 234 This was the very purpose of
Section 5, forcing covered jurisdictions to re-think about the types of
voting laws and electoral processes they wanted to implement. DOJ and
Section 5 achieved more than any one court decision in preventing the
implementation of discriminatory voting practices and procedures.
Although compelling states to comply with the law through a system of
"forced compliance" aggravated an already politically unappealing
situation for southern state legislators, the process was effective at
protecting racial and language minorities' right to vote, which was the
entire purpose of the VRA, and its subsequent amendments. But Shelby
County changed all that.
In Shelby County, the Court conceded that voting discrimination exists,
and that states have historically imposed disparate treatment on certain
racial and ethnic minority groups with respect to voting rights and access to
232
233
234

WALKER, DAVID B. The Rebirth of Federalism:Slouching Toward Washington (1995).
MIDDLEMASS, supra note 1.

Id.
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the polls, and covered jurisdictions did not disappoint the Court; within
days of the decision, some covered jurisdictions dusted off earlier electoral
changes that were denied preclearance by DOJ before Shelby County and
began implementing them. The Court undermined the very provisions that
it acknowledged historically prevented the large scale implementation of
laws that had a racially discriminate effect or intent.
Post-Shelby County, now that the Supreme Court has removed the
preclearance provision designed to prevent "backsliding," discriminatory
political obstacles are now prevalent in previously covered jurisdictions,
particularly in the South.2 35 Covered states are throwing caution to the
wind and passing racially discriminatory laws almost every legislative
session, including changing voter identification requirements, moving the
location and changing the hours polling places are open, and reallocating
resources (e.g. voting forms, registrars, and voting machines) to polling
places in heavily populated areas so that fewer machines are accessible to a
large number of people. The political motivation behind such legislation is
to discourage minority voters from voting, and is the very type of racially
discriminatory changes that Section 5's preclearance provision was
intended to prevent.2 36
Although Shelby County was decided in 2013, covered jurisdictions were
moving in this direction prior to the actual decision. Since 2010, new
voting laws that curtail voters' ability to cast a ballot have been passed in
22 states, 237 and in 2012, some jurisdictions' decisions about polling places
and voting booths forced voters to stand in line for hours waiting to access
one of the few voting machines available in their precinct.2 38 But since
Shelby County, conservative state legislatures outside of the South and
states that supported Jim Crow have recently passed laws restricting voting
rights; previously, these states were covered by Section 4(b) but knowing
235

KATZ & BALDWIN, supra note 163.

236 HIROSHI MOTOMURA. PreclearanceUnder Section Five of the Voting Rights Act. 61 NORTH
CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 189 (1983).

237 JUSTIN LEVITT, Analysis of Alleged Fraud in Briefs Supporting Crawford Respondents,
Brennan
Center
For
Justice
(Dec.
31,
2007).
Available
at:
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/egacy/Democracy/Analysis%2of/2OCrawford%20A
llegations.pdf.
238 Prior to Shelby County, and during the 2012 presidential election in Florida, national TV
stations displayed pictures of voters in predominantly minority areas standing in line for 4-5 hours
waiting for the right to cast a ballot to re-elect President Obama. Long lines were reported in
Philadelphia, Charlotte, Atlanta, and other cities and counties; voting rights lawyers on the ground
submitted petitions to local judges asking that the polling places remain open until after they were
scheduled to close and/or to allow anyone in line by a certain time the right to vote, regardless of the
time of night. Shelby County has now exacerbated this process, and voting rights lawyers set to monitor
and report violations of voting rights can no longer challenge these laws under Section 5 post-election
in an effort to reduce such racial disparity in future elections.
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they no longer have to preclear election laws, they have been actively
passing new laws with the intent and knowledge to disenfranchisement
voters.
Some of the new laws are dubious about their racially
discriminatory intent and effect, while some are clearly geared towards
undermining racial minorities voting strength, but because these new plans
no longer have to pass muster with DOJ or the D.C.D.C. conservative state
legislators are emboldened to disenfranchise as many likely Democratic
voters as possible.
The most prominent of these laws are new voting ID requirements, but
the passage of new voting ID laws follow similar patterns from the past.
Supporters of new voter ID laws, such as conservative state legislators in
the North and Republicans in covered jurisdictions in the South, argue that
new voter ID laws are necessary due to voter fraud at the polls; in response
to the manufactured fear of widespread and rampant voter fraud, legislators
have moved to pass new laws designed to counter the epidemic of voter
fraud. In reality, voter fraud is a myth,239 and at best is an insignificant
problem. 240 Overwhelming objective evidence demonstrates that voter
fraud at the polls is minimal, and most of the cases where evidence is found
that voter fraud did take place are not prosecuted due to legitimate
misunderstanding by voters about the shifting requirements about who is
eligible to vote. 24 1 In an analysis of 400 million votes cast over a sevenyear period, nine possible instances of fraudulently cast ballots were
found. 242 The Bush Administration conducted a five-year investigation to
find evidence of voter fraud; when evidence was found, it was of instances
of voters mistakenly filling out voter registration forms or voting when they
did not know they were ineligible to vote. None of these fraud cases
involved a person voting as someone else. 24 3 When there have been claims
of voter fraud, U.S. District attorneys have found no evidence of such, and
239 JUSTIN LEVITT, In-Person Voter FraudMyth, Justin Levitt Before Senate Committee, Brennan
Center For Justice, (Mar. 12, 2008), Available at: http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/person-voterfraud-myth-justin-levitt-senate-conmittee#_edn2.
240 LEVITT, supranote 237 and supra note 239.
241 JUSTIN LEVITT, The Truth About Voter Fraud (A Brennan Center Report demonstrates that the
allegations of voter fraud are untrue: "There have been a handful of substantiated cases of individual
ineligible voters attempting to defraud the election system. But by any measure, voter fraud is
extraordinary rare" (page 7). Available at http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/truth-about-voterfraud.
242 LEVITT, supra note 241.
243 ERIc LIPTON and IAN URBINA, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud,N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.corri2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html?pagewanted=all&_rO;
See also, LORRAINE C. MINNITE, Securing the Vote, voter fraud is very rare, Demos: A Network for
Ideas & Action, (2003), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Analysis.pdf (providing
an overview of voter fraud history in the United States).
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have not been able to confirm a case of in-person voter impersonation
fraud. 244 There are only a handful of cases in which someone has been
found guilty of voting under false pretense; yet, many conservative
politicians argue that voter fraud is a pervasive problem, while their
opponents argue that there is no problem. 245
Objective research
demonstrates that in-person voting fraud is a statistical anomaly. 24 6 But,
because right wing politicians and conservative groups have pushed the
idea that voting fraud is a major problem in U.S. elections, and that voter
fraud is undermining the ability to have honest elections, they can justify
the passage of new laws to protect the legitimacy of voting and election
outcomes.
Even though there are few legitimate and authentic cases of voter fraud
and in-person voter fraud, new state laws are wrapped in the language of
fraud and legitimacy. 2 47 For instance, prior to the 2012 presidential
election, Pennsylvania legislators made a push to restrict access to the polls
by limiting the number of acceptable types of voter identification in
Pennsylvanians (Philadelphia was a covered city) could use.
One
prominent legislator, when the law was passed, praised his colleagues and
declared that Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, would win
the state now that Pennsylvania had restricted the number of ways
legitimate voters could vote. The ACLU in Pennsylvania challenged the
new voter ID law due to the numerous obstacles it created; would-be
eligible voters encountered numerous administrative hurdles and
impediments when attempting to obtain the new state mandated
identification from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
Although the law was only to apply to first-time voters, who had to show a
state approved ID with their legal name, recent photo with expiration date
(and not be expired), and that the identification must be issued by the
United States government or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, voters
had problems accessing the required information to validate their identity.
The only acceptable alternative IDs had to be issued by a municipality of
the Commonwealth to an employee of that municipality, an accredited
Pennsylvania public or private institution of higher learning or a
Pennsylvania care facility (e.g. long-term care or senior citizens'
residence). Although a short list of alternative IDs was provided, the ACLU
244 LEVITT, supra note 237 and supra note 239.
245 LEVITT, supranote 241 and supra note 243.
246 Id.
247 Voter ID Laws Target Rarely Occurring Voter Fraud, Fox News Politics (Sept. 24, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/24/voter-id-laws-target-rarely-occurring-voter-fraud/.
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challenged the law based on its racial discriminatory intent; the ACLU was
successful, as the court found that the new voter ID law was
unconstitutional as it deprived eligible citizens of their fundamental right to
vote.2 48 Some may argue that the new voter ID law was not about voter
fraud, but about restricting the voting rights of largely Democratic voting
groups.
In the immediate aftermath of Shelby County, Alabama's southern
neighbors moved to pass and implement new voting laws that would have
previously been denied preclearance by DOJ or the D.C.D.C. The states of
the Old Confederacy, such as Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina, moved
quickly in the days after Shelby County to make sure that new restrictive
voting policies were in place prior to the 2014 congressional elections, and
so that any legal challenges would not hurt the Republican presidential
nominee in the 2016 presidential election. Without Section 5, state
legislators can pass and implement laws that knowingly have a
discriminatory intent or effect, and wait to see if such laws are challenged
in court. For instance, previous attempts to pass restrictive voting ID laws
in Texas were blocked by DOJ, but once the Court removed preclearance
as an obstacle, Texas, on the day that Shelby County was decided,
announced it would implement the state's strict photo identification law,
which had previously been blocked; DOJ lawyers argued that the law was
unconstitutional due to its racially discriminatory intent to restrict poor
voters and language minorities' access to the franchise. U.S. District Judge
Nelva Gonzales Ramos agreed, calling the law an unconstitutional burden
that operated like a poll-tax to purposely discriminate against poor voters in
Texas. 249 However, with preclearance now a moot issue and with no
impending legal challenge under Section 2 of the VRA, the 51h Circuit
Court of Appeals in New Orleans reinstated Texas' racially discriminatory
voter ID law for the November 2014 election, which was only possible
because of Shelby County. At the time of Circuit Court's decision, DOJ
lawyers argued that Texas' law was the most recent means to suppress
minority voter registration and turnout, and it would not be the last. The
Texas ID law is considered the toughest of its kind, and requires registered
248 See Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL
4497211, at *I (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (holding that individuals and organizations were entitled
to preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Voter ID Law which amended
the provisional ballot procedures of the Election Code and caused disenfranchisement based on failure
to present photo ID for in-person voting, but individuals and organizations were not entitled to
preliminary injunction prohibiting all outreach and education efforts required by the Voter ID Law).
249 Tomas Lopez, 'Shelby County: One Year Later', BRENNAN CENTER (June 24, 2014). Available
at: http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later.

2015] THE NEED TO RESURRECTSECTION5 OF THE VOTNG RIGHTSACT

101

Texas voters to have one of seven kinds of photo identification to register
250
and cast a ballot.
In Georgia, the state's Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring voters
to show identification before they cast ballots. The state's highest court
dismissed objections from those who contended that the law creates an
undue burden on poor, disabled and minority voters. The Georgia Supreme
Court ruled that the new law was minimally intrusive, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, and that there was no constitutional issue because the
Georgia Constitution grants that everyone has an "absolute right" to vote,
as long as they meet the required qualifications. Georgia and Texas' laws
are very similar to Indiana's ID law, which was found constitutional in an
earlier case, and said to be the most restrictive ID law at the time in
2008.251

In North Carolina, the state legislature passed a strict photo identification
requirement, significantly reduced the number of early voting days, and
condensed the window to register to vote. 252 Prior to Shelby County, the
legislation would have had to been pre-cleared under Section 5; a study by
the N.C. State Board of Elections identified more than 300,000 voters who
lacked the appropriate state-issued identification but who were otherwise
eligible to vote.2 53 North Carolina passed the law, but only announced its
plan to implement it after Shelby County.254 Alabama followed suit,
implementing a similar law that would have been required to be precleared,
but was never submitted to DOJ because Shelby County made that process
irrelevant.2 55 In the aftermath of Shelby County, mostly Republican
legislators are passing restrictions on voting access, and southern states
previously covered by Section 5 are adopting restrictive laws adopted in
northern states not covered by the VRA. In effect, the VRA has been
scaled back as its most effective tools to protect minority voting rights have
250 Supreme Court Allows Texas To Use Voter ID Law In November, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(October 18, 2014, 6:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/18/357117516/supreme-court-allows-texasto-use-voter-id-law-in-november. College identification is not on the list, but concealed handgun

licenses are acceptable. Id.
251 Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
252 LAURA LESLIE, NC Voter ID Bill Moving Ahead With Supreme Court Ruling, WRAL.COM
(June 25, 2013), http://www.wral.com/nc-senator-voter-id-bill-moving-ahead-with-ruling/ 12591669/.
253 North Carolina State Board of Elections, April 2013 SBOE-DMV ID Analysis 9, COATES'
CANONS: NC LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (April 17, 2013), available at http://canons.sog.unc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/St-Bd-voter-ID-report.pdf.
254 KIM CHANDLER, Alabama Photo Voter ID Law to be Used in 2014, State Officials Say,
AL.cOM
(June
26,
2013,
12:43
PM),
Available
at:
http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/06/alabama photovoter-id-law-to.htmI.
255 KIM CHANDLER, State Has Yet to Seek Preclearance of Photo Voter ID Law Approved in 2011,
AL.COM (June 12, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/06/photo-voter id.html.
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2 56
been defeated by conservative Justices on the Supreme Court.
Although race relations have changed since the Act's passage in 1965,
the last 50 years have not wiped clean racial animosity and discriminatory
laws; racially polarized voting is still common in many parts of the country,
particularly in the South, and many southern jurisdictions continue to
manipulate election laws and voting rules to dilute the voting strength of
minority voters. 25 7 In the 2 1St Century, this is not just the Black/White
racial divide of the 1960s; in the last three presidential elections (2004,
2008 and 2012), Latino and Asian American voters are increasing in many
states such as Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.
Texas, a
previously covered state, where some communities are composed of ninety
percent Latino voters, majority white elected officials have implemented
racially biased laws concerning bilingual poll workers. 258 Prior to Shelby
County, such a change would have been examined by DOJ or been
reviewed by the D.C.D.C. to determine if it was racially motivated with the
intent to block Latino voters from accessing their constitutional right to a
fair ballot.2 59 As the voting demographics of the country change, minority
language voters will no longer be protected by the 1975 Amendments,
which incorporated language minorities and the right to bilingual election
notices; without Section 5, bilingual ballots, registrars, and other remedies
to ensure citizens the right to vote are undermined without Section 4(b)'s
coverage formula.
When voting rights are attacked under the pretense of fraud or
illegitimacy, the political rhetoric echoes the past, when primarily Black
voters had to fight to the death for their voting rights under an umbrella that
they were illegitimate voters based on their skin color. Other racial
minorities, including Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans, have had to
also fight for their right to vote due to invidious and offensive laws that
denied them their citizenship right to vote. The current political climate
around the right to vote and the implementation of restrictive voting rights
laws harken back to DuBois' prophecy that the problem of the 2 0 th Century
would be the problem of the color line. 2 60 To maintain the color line, white
elites invested a tremendous amount of political effort in restricting access

256
257
258
259
260
Speech

SPENCER OVERTON. Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2013).
OVERTON, supra note 246.
Id.
Id.
William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) DuBois. 1900. Address to the Nations of the World.
to the First Pan-African Conference. London, England (July).
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to the ballot in the first half of the 20' h Century. 26 1 Now, the political and
social messages that reverberate in the larger community harkens back to
the color line, and echoes the past that Black people are not welcome in
society, its political structures, and its power center; this attitude of white
hegemony, when amplified by the media, is passed onto elected officials
who write their ideology into voting rights law designed to restrict and
institutionalize the language that Black skin is wrapped in a cloak of fraud
and illegitimacy. The color line of the 2 0 th Century was a defining issue in
the fight for voting rights and access to the ballot 262 and that same fight is
being played out in the early part of the 21 " Century.
Section 5 previously required preclearance of any change to voting
qualifications, standards, practices or procedures, which was of critical
importance due to continued racial animus. Yet, Section 5 protected more
than just racial minorities' right to vote; the provision also protected
minority language voters. Shelby County removed those protections;
without preclearance, local voting changes that are racially discriminatory
no longer will be stopped and local jurisdictions will not be deterred from
creating and implementing discriminatory election rules. 263
Without
Section 5, the floodgates have been opened, and formerly covered states
have wasted no time in changing their electoral laws. Some of these laws
have been successfully challenged in court, others were implemented in the
2014 election cycle, and still more will be enacted and implemented prior
to the 2016 presidential election cycle. The challenged statutes will now
have to be contested on a case-by-case basis under Section 2 of the VRA,
which the Court has deemed in the past to be a costly, time-consuming,
inefficient and inadequate method to root out discriminatory voting
practices. 264 Section 5 was designed to create an efficient process to
prevent the need to rely on litigation alone in challenging the
discriminatory intent or effect of voting laws, 265 but when the Court
declared Section 4(b) unconstitutional, it made Section 5 meaningless.
Section 5 is still on the books, but it is now dead law, and without the
261

Herbert Blumer. 1965. The Future of the Color Line; The South in Continuity and Change,

edited by John McKinney & Edgar Thompson, 322-336. Durham, NC: DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
262 See e.g., Blumer, supra note 301; Michael Goldfield, 1991; The Color of Politics in the United
States: White Supremacy as the Main Explanation for the Peculiarities of American Politics from
Colonial Times to the Present," THE BOUNDS OF RACE: PERSPECTIVES ON HEGEMONY AND
RESISTANCE, edited by Dominick LaCapra, 104-133. Ithaca, NY: CORNELL UNIV. PRESS; Key, V. 0.,
Jr. 1949; Southern Politics in State andNation. New York: Knopf.
263 Id.
264 See POSNER, supra note 28.

265 Section 2, which prohibits discriminatory voting practices and laws, is only good to challenge
existing laws, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff in Section 2 litigation.
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formula coverage of Section 4(b) to prescribe which jurisdictions were
covered by Section 5, it will remain dead law, as no states or political
jurisdictions are currently covered by Section 5, and therefore are not
required to submit their electoral and voting changes for preclearance.
Without Section 5 and Section 4(b), the most effective deterrents against
the implementation of harmful and discriminatory election laws have been
removed.2 66 Only Congress can change the law and overturn Shelby
County via new legislative language, but it is highly unlikely in the current
political climate in which politicians continually denigrate President
Obama. 267 But instead of a post-racial society, newer forms of the ugly
past have emerged; America has witnessed the passage of laws that harken
back to the Black Codes, including placing more restrictions on otherwise
eligible voters who are now required to purchase a specific state voter ID
(e.g. Texas and Georgia), states' election boards purging voter-rolls of
Black and Latino "sounding" names, and the U.S. Supreme Court
overturning a key feature of the Voting Rights Act.
Despite voting being a fundamental right in a working democracy, 268 in
this current political climate, it is unlikely that Congress will amend the
VRA and undue Shelby County; instead, Shelby County will remain in
place as a landmark decision in 2013, and be known as the case that undid
266 TOMAS LOPEZ, 'Shelby County: One Year Later', BRENNAN CENTER (June 24, 2014),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later.
267 The tone and tenor of the personal attacks on President Obama, I believe, are grounded in
racism; other presidents have had their politics, policies, and values attacked, but the depth and degree
of verbal assaults and insults by current and former elected officials towards President Obama is
different, as the attackers' words and actions are an explicit form of hostility wrapped in the language of
fraud, corruption, and treason. It is the language of racism. Collectively, such behavior expresses
whites' deep unease of Blacks' political rights, claims of citizenship, and access to the hallways of
political power, which can be traced back to the founding of the country and the 1860s, when property
(i.e. slaves) became citizens, and former slaves were granted the rights of citizenship, including the
right to vote. Since, Black Americans have continually fought for legitimacy in the unrelenting face of
oppression, and when overt racism raises its ugly head (e.g. the racially charged shooting of 9
parishioners at the Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina on
June 17, 2015; and when white police officers act as judge, jury and executioner of black men and
women and children, and if they are indicted are found "not guilty" because they feared for their lives),
politicians and regular people come together to say that change is needed.
268 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that a
facially neutral statute concerning fire safety in laundries was administered and implemented in a
racially discriminated manner and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Approximately 90% of the workers in laundries in San Francisco were of Chinese descent though not
usually American citizens. The law was a blatant attempt to exclude Chinese workers from the laundry
trade in San Francisco. Later, all of the Chinese laundry owners who were jailed were released and the
charges against them were dismissed. The laundry owners' citizenship was not an issue conceming
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo was never applied to Black Codes or Jim Crow
laws that were racially neutral but implemented in a racially discriminatory manner against Blacks.
However, legislative and statutory classifications based on race in the 1950s, were challenged under
Yick Wo, and its legacy became significant when the opinion was used to challenge sub-populations
racially motivated attempts to deny Blacks the right to vote in the Deep South. Id.
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more than 50 years of voting rights advancement. Shelby County is
significant for its ability to alter the judicial and administrative landscape
for voting rights; now, DOJ has fewer legal options and resources to have
formerly covered states comply with the original goals of the VRA, which
means conservative legislators can pass racially discriminatory election
laws with few consequences. This is the unfolding controversy attached to
Shelby County; the case single-handedly undermined Section 5, and has
allowed the false narrative about "voter fraud" and the "integrity of voting"
become the impetus for new restrictive voter ID laws and other laws that
suppress minority voting rights. The attack on voting rights is not new;
political parties in power pass laws to maintain their majorities, and in
formerly covered states, the shifting race and ethnic demographic changes
are challenging the ability of the Republican Party to maintain its political
power. In one-party states dominated by the Republican Party (e.g. the
former Confederacy), conservative legislators are passing laws that attack
voting rights on a wide scale because it is the only way the party can hold
on to its political power. By disenfranchising Democratic Party supporters,
who's growth outpace the Republican Party's aging traditional voting base,
Republicans can hold onto political power a little bit longer; however,
demographic changes and generational replacement will continue unabated.
The ideal situation would have Congress, in a show of bipartisanship, make
the needed legislative changes to the VRA to resuscitate Section 4(b),
which would resurrect Section 5 and allow DOJ and the D.C.D.C. to
enforce preclearance and prevent the implementation of racially and
ethnically discriminatory laws.

